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Abstract
When can you cheat some people without damaging your reputation among others?
In a trust game between a ﬁrm and a series of individuals from minority and majority
groups, the ﬁrm has more incentive to cheat minority individuals because trade with the
minority is less frequent and the long-term beneﬁts of a reputation for fairness toward
them are correspondingly smaller. If the majority is suﬃciently large it gains nothing
from a solidarity strategy of punishing opportunism against the minority, so the ﬁrm
can continue doing business with the majority even if it cheats the minority. When a
small fraction of ﬁrms have a preference-based bias against the minority, the interaction
with reputation eﬀects gives all ﬁrms a stronger incentive to cheat the minority, and
discrimination is the unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium for ﬁrms of intermediate
patience.
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‡Bureau of Labor Statistics, To_T@bls.govWhere people seldom deal with one another, we ﬁnd that they are somewhat
disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can
lose by the injury which it does their character.
—A d a mS m i t h ,Lectures on Jurisprudence, 1766
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How do people react when other people are cheated? If a person’s land is stolen during
ethnic unrest, is the perpetrator viewed as generally opportunistic or as someone who can
still be trusted in his own community? If a tourist is cheated in front of local customers,
is the oﬀender seen as untrustworthy in general or only toward outsiders? If a woman is
u n f a i r l yd e n i e dp a r t n e r s h i pb yal a wﬁrm, do her colleagues expect a similar fate and leave
or do they see the ﬁrm as opportunistic only toward women? If a government expropriates
foreign investors, is it treated as untrustworthyt o w a r de v e r y o n eo ro n l yt o w a r df o r e i g n e r s ?
If an insurance company fails to pay one group of customers, do other customers expect
similar opportunism or do they still expect to be treated fairly?
The incentive to engage in opportunism clearly depends on this question of how people
are expected to react to it. As Smith (1766) noted, a trader must decide whether the short-
run gains from cheating are worth the loss from a damaged reputation. But in evaluating
this tradeoﬀ it is not clear that all acts of opportunism aﬀect reputation in the same way. If
a person from one group is cheated, can people from another group choose to ignore it and
proceed with business as usual? If so, then the incentive to cheat a person can depend on
the person’s group identity, so that it might be proﬁtable to cheat members of one group
but not another.
This idea that opportunism can be discriminatory in its target is surprisingly absent
from economic theories of discrimination. Standard models including occupational segre-
gation (Fawcett, 1892), non-competitive wage setting (Fawcett, 1918; Edgeworth, 1922),
discriminatory preferences (Becker, 1957), statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow,
1973; Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Coate and Loury, 1993), and search costs (Mailath et al.,
2000; Lundberg and Startz, 2007) do not capture the idea that people from some groups are
more likely to be taken advantage of than others.1 Unequal access to the legal system can be
part of the problem (Douglass, 1879), but even an unbiased legal system oﬀers incomplete
1For a recent survey see Donahue (2007).
1protection from opportunism due to the diﬃculty of adjudicating disputes (Williamson,
1985). We examine how opportunism can be discriminatory in an environment where the
primary constraint is reputational rather than contractual or legal.
To understand the interaction between opportunism and discrimination, we model a re-
peated trust game (Kreps, 1990) between a ﬁrm and a set of individuals. In each period one
of the individuals trusts the ﬁrm by making an investment or other resource commitment,
and the ﬁrm then either cheats the individual by taking most of the gains of the transaction,
or lets the individual beneﬁt also. Since only one player has the choice of whether to be
opportunistic, this “one-sided prisoner’s dilemma” is the simplest environment in which to
analyze reputation. Versions of it have been used to capture relations between a ﬁrm and its
contractors (Klein and Leﬄer, 1981), an owner and a series of managers (Radner, 1985), a
salesperson and his customers (Dasgupta, 1990), a government and foreign merchants (Greif
et al., 1994), etc. Consistent with Smith’s early arguments, if trade is suﬃciently frequent,2
or equivalently if the ﬁrm is suﬃciently patient, trust can be sustained by a trigger strategy
where everyone initially trusts the ﬁrm but if the ﬁrm cheats anyone then no one trusts the
ﬁrm again.3
We analyze this game when the set of individuals is divided into two identiﬁable groups
that interact with the ﬁrm with diﬀerent frequencies, i.e., one is the “majority” and the
other the “minority”. We ﬁrst consider the standard trigger strategy, which we now call
the “solidarity trigger strategy.” Given such a strategy it is foolish for the ﬁrm to cheat
anyone unless it plans to cheat everyone, so there is a reputation spillover and individuals
are right to stop trusting the ﬁrm if it cheats a member of the other group. We then consider
a “discriminatory trigger strategy” where individuals stop trusting the ﬁrm if it cheats a
member of their own group, but continue to trust the ﬁrm if a member of the other group is
cheated. Given such a strategy the ﬁrm recognizes that it can maintain part of its reputation
even after cheating a member of the other group. Depending on how much the ﬁrm values
its reputation, a discrimination equilibrium exists in which the ﬁrm is trustworthy toward
one group but not toward the other group.
2Smith (1766) argued that opportunism decreases with the frequency of commercial exchange and was
therefore highest in undeveloped regions like his native Scotland. He also argued that opportunism is more
likely in political and diplomatic activities where transactions are less frequent than they are in commerce.
3However, in the trigger strategy everyone beneﬁts ex post by forgiving the ﬁrm’s cheating, implying that
the trigger strategy might not be credible ex ante (Farrell and Weizsacker, 2001). We resolve this problem
by introducing some uncertainty over the ﬁrm’s type which induces a reputational concern to not cheat.
2Since the minority group is smaller, transactions with the minority are rarer, and the
value of maintaining a reputation for fairness toward the minority is correspondingly smaller.
Therefore, even though majority and minority individuals are identical and the ﬁrm need
not have any discriminatory preferences, we ﬁnd that a discrimination equilibrium with
discrimination against the minority is supported by a wider range of discount rates for the
ﬁrm. Both the ﬁrm and the minority are better oﬀ ex ante if the ﬁrm can be trusted, but the
minority is too small to suﬃciently punish the ﬁrm for any opportunism so the ﬁrm has an
incentive to cheat the minority ex post unless the majority switches to the solidarity trigger
strategy. If the majority is suﬃciently large to protect itself by punishing opportunism
against its own members, then it gains nothing from switching strategies.
These results show that discrimination can arise even when the ﬁrm is only interested
in maximizing its proﬁts and does not have any preference-based biases as in Becker (1957).
Nevertheless, there is evidence that such preference-based biases exist (e.g., Bertrand et al.,
2006) and have important economic eﬀects (Charles and Guryan, 2008). To examine the
interaction of such biases with reputation eﬀects, we allow for the possibility that the ﬁrm
is a biased ﬁrm that prefers to cheat one group. Clearly if such bias is widespread then
individuals will be afraid to trust the ﬁrm. We are interested in the case where bias is
relatively rare so that any eﬀect must be indirect through its interaction with reputation,
and we allow for bias against either the majority or the minority.
We ﬁnd that there is no impact if the potential bias is against the majority, but if the
ﬁrm might be biased against the minority then such bias interacts with reputation eﬀects
to make discrimination the unique coalition-proof equilibrium for ﬁrms of intermediate
patience. Even when majority individuals start with a solidarity strategy, if they believe
that an act of cheating the minority is probably due to bias rather than opportunism, they
have an incentive to renegotiate their punishment strategy and continue business as usual.
Therefore a biased ﬁr mc a nr e a pb o t ht h es h o r t - t e r mb e n e ﬁts from cheating and the long-
term beneﬁts from a good reputation with the majority. A non-biased ﬁrm of intermediate
patience then has an incentive to pool with biased ﬁrms by also cheating the minority. For
instance, a proprietor might literally add insult to injury after cheating a customer in order
to suggest to other customers that his opportunism is limited to a particular group.
This paper emphasizes reputational constraints on opportunism, but contractual and le-
gal constraints are typically also present. A large literature investigates when these diﬀerent
constraints are substitutes or complements (e.g., Ostrom, 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002;
3Lazzarini et al., 2004). In the context of opportunistic discrimination, a related question is
how contractual and legal constraints interact with reputational constraints across groups.
In many countries diﬀerential access to the legal system allows some groups but not others
to gain contractual protection against opportunism. We ﬁnd that increased contractual
protection for the majority reduces the dependence of the majority on reputational sanc-
tions, and thereby weakens reputational constraints on opportunism against the minority,
leaving the minority worse oﬀ than if both groups were forced to rely on reputation alone.
Regarding anti-discrimination policies, we ﬁnd that targeting enforcement against op-
portunistic discrimination, i.e., penalizing the particular behavior of a ﬁrm being oppor-
tunistic toward one group and fair toward another, is more eﬀective at reducing total op-
portunism than either general enforcement which penalizes any opportunism or one-sided
enforcement which penalizes opportunism directed at one group regardless of its behav-
ior toward the other group. Comparatively small amounts of such enforcement can break
the discrimination equilibrium, leading to the solidarity equilibrium with its low levels of
opportunism. In contrast, the other forms of enforcement can in some cases aggravate
opportunistic discrimination or lead to a reverse discrimination equilibrium.
Applying the model to an employment environment, our results imply that minority
workers in the discrimination equilibrium will be reluctant to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁch u m a n
capital for fear of having their quasi-rents appropriated. This is similar to the argument
from the statistical discrimination literature that discrimination can be a self-fulﬁlling equi-
librium in that fear of discrimination leads to an underinvestment in human capital. Such
models do not indicate why one group rather than another group suﬀers from discrimina-
tion. In contrast, we make the particular prediction that discrimination is directed against
the minority. This prediction is consistent with the common perception that “minorities”
in diﬀerent societies are at a disadvantage. It is also consistent with survey data showing
that both men and women are more likely to report gender discrimination in occupations
in which their gender is in the minority (Antecol and Kuhn, 2000), with laboratory exper-
iments showing that minorities are less trusting (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001), and
with ﬁeld experiments showing that minorities are more likely to be taken advantage of in
bargaining environments (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Ayres, 2001).
While absent from the discrimination literature, the idea that some people are more
vulnerable to opportunism is inherent to the argument in the social capital literature that
4social networks facilitate communication and trust (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Dasgupta, 1990).4
The ability to communicate information about opportunism is central to the Greif (1993)
model of long-distance traders, the Greif et al. (1994) model of merchant guilds, the Dixit
(2003) model of trade networks in which distant trade is both more valuable and harder
to monitor, and to the Annen (2003) model of inclusive networks in which larger networks
expand cooperation opportunities at the cost of weaker communication about who coop-
erates. This literature looks at outcomes that are eﬃcient subject to diﬀerential access to
information through networks about who is trustworthy.
We diﬀer from the social capital literature in focusing on how ineﬃcient discrimination
equilibria can arise even with public information.5 Since individuals are aware of oppor-
tunism against members of other groups, they must decide whether to punish opportunism
against some people and not others. There are typically multiple equilibria so the individ-
ually optimal decisions of ﬁrms and individuals depend on the decisions of others. Since
unequal outcomes in our model are not the unavoidable product of diﬀerent social networks,
but instead are the result of decisions by individuals who face strategic uncertainty about
how to best pursue their own interests, our approach can leave a large role for cultural ex-
pectations and norms in helping determine what equilibria prevail. For instance, if a society
has a history of extreme racial or ethnic divisions then equilibria based on such diﬀerences
might be more focal.
A fundamental insight of the discrimination literature is that competitive markets un-
dermine discrimination (Fawcett, 1918; Becker, 1957). Since there is “strength in numbers”
in our model, the relevant question is whether in an environment with multiple ﬁrms the
minority can concentrate its business so that transactions are frequent enough to ensure fair
treatment. We examine this issue in an extension to the model where we allow for diﬀerent
allocations of individuals across ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the minority can sometimes beneﬁt
from “self-segregation,” but that the minority does equally well and sometimes better by
concentrating its business on a single ﬁrm that also does business with the majority. For
instance, the minority might be treated more fairly by a large corporation than by a small
ﬁrm that specializes in business with the minority.
4As analyzed in the early literature on social capital (Loury, 1977), members of diﬀerent groups have
diﬀering costs and beneﬁts of investing in human capital even without overt opportunism, e.g., if a social
network has more skilled members historically then it is easier for new members to acquire skills.
5As shown in an earlier draft of this paper, if information about ﬁrm opportunism is not public the
intuition that better access to information can help compensate for a smaller group size holds in our model.
5In deciding whether to trust or not, individuals might not know beforehand how patient
the ﬁrm is but instead learn about the ﬁrm from its actions. Examining this case in an
extension to the model, we ﬁnd that the minority faces the most danger that the ﬁrm
will take advantage of misplaced trust. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms might “spend down” their
reputation by ﬁrst being fair to the majority, then cheating the minority, and then cheating
the majority. If the majority fails to stand up to opportunism against the minority initially,
it ﬁnds itself facing a ﬁrm which has already lost part of its reputation, and therefore has
less to lose from also cheating the majority. If the ﬁrm is relatively impatient, it will use
the opportunity to switch from being fair to the majority to cheating it, thereby doubling
the short-run gains from opportunism.
The model oﬀers insight into how impersonal reputation systems such as traditional
credit bureaus and, more recently, internet websites (Resnick et al., 2000) can reduce dis-
crimination. The economics and social capital literatures have noted that such systems
make information about opportunism more public, thereby reducing diﬀerential access to
information and reducing the need for informal networks to share information. From the
perspective of this model, an additional beneﬁt is that information about the group af-
ﬁliation of victims of opportunism is typically not public, so users of reputation systems
cannot condition their response to opportunism based on such information. Therefore the
discrimination equilibria we consider cannot arise.
Our analysis is complementary to the literature on collective reputations of diﬀerent
groups in repeated games following Tirole (1996). This literature is related to the statistical
discrimination literature in that it shows that when individuals within a group are not clearly
diﬀerentiated, their reputations will depend in part on the reputation of their group, and
that reputation diﬀerences between groups can be self-perpetuating. While this literature
analyzes reputations for trustworthiness by diﬀerent groups, this paper consider reputations
for trustworthiness toward diﬀerent groups.6 To emphasize this focus of the paper, the ﬁrm
in our model is not required to have a group identity.7
The following section provides our basic model of a trust game. Section 3 then ex-
6In a one-shot assurance game, Basu (2005) shows how cooperation can break down between groups
even while it is maintained within groups, so the analysis incorporates an aspect of trustworthiness toward
diﬀerent groups.
7The identity of the ﬁrm owner or manager could serve as a focal point for helping choose between
equilibria with and without discrimination, especially if concern for identity is part of the utility function as
in Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The identity of the ﬁrm player is central to the analysis of Annen (2001) in
which diﬀerent groups might have diﬀerent stereotypes about a ﬁrm’s trustworthiness.
6tends this model to capture added realism in a number of aspects, including the interac-
tion between reputation and preference-based discrimination, limited communication about
opportunism, the interaction between reputation and explicit enforcement against oppor-
tunism, the potential for individuals self-selecting into diﬀerent ﬁrms, and uncertainty over
the ﬁrm’s discount factor. Section 4 then concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider an inﬁnitely repeated trust (or “hold-up”) game (Kreps, 1990) in which in
each stage or period an “individual” decides whether to trust a “ﬁrm” and then the ﬁrm
decides whether to cheat the individual or not. We assume that the individual is randomly
chosen from a ﬁnite population of players who are of two observationally distinct groups.8
The ﬁrm is the same player in each period and its group identity is not relevant for the
analysis. Since the trust game only allows for opportunism in one direction, and since only
the individuals are from distinct groups, this game is perhaps the simplest game that can
capture opportunistic discrimination.
The stage game is depicted in Figure 1 where the individual trusts the ﬁrm or not and
then, if given the opportunity, the ﬁrm cheats the individual or is fair. Trusting involves an
up-front cost c>0 paid by the individual. This cost could be a price for a good of unsure
quality paid by a customer, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investment by an employee, a loan
made by a creditor, a transaction-speciﬁc investment by a supplier, etc. If the individual
trusts the ﬁrm (trades with it), then the ﬁrm is either fair and the individual receives α
where c<α<1, or cheats and the individuals receives β where 0 <β<c . The total gross
value of the trade is normalized to 1 so the ﬁrm receives 1 − α from being fair and 1 − β
from cheating. In the no-trust case there is no trade and both sides earn 0.
In each period the ﬁrm is randomly matched with one of n>1 individuals from one of
the two groups p ∈ {x,y} of size np where nx >n y ≥ 1. The match is independent across
individuals and time so the probability that a particular individual is matched in any period
is 1/n and the probability that a matched individual is from group p is γp = np/n.9 Firms
discount the period between transactions by a common knowledge factor δ ∈ (0,1).W e
8The ﬁniteness assumption facilitates description of the model but is not central to the results.
9This implies that the larger group does more business with the ﬁrm. Alternatively one could allow the
smaller group to represent the bulk of the business, in which case it is eﬀectively the majority from the
perspective of our analysis.
7Figure 1: Game tree in each period: 0 <β<c<α<1.
say a ﬁrm with a higher discount factor is more “patient” although this could also reﬂect a
lower interest rate, a higher probability of survival to the next period, or a shorter interval
between transactions. Individuals all share the same non-zero discount factor where the
exact value does not aﬀect the game.
To model reputation eﬀects, in each period that the ﬁrm trades there is a small indepen-
dent probability ε>0 that the ﬁrm goes bad and transitions from being a “normal” ﬁrm
which weighs the costs and beneﬁts of cheating to being an “inept” ﬁrm which always cheats
the individual.10 For instance, the ﬁrm becomes very impatient due to ﬁnancial problems,
or cannot meet its obligations due to changes in ownership or the loss of key employees. We
therefore follow the “separating” rather than “pooling” approach to reputation (Mailath
and Samuelson, 2006), i.e., normal ﬁrms maintain their reputation by separating themselves
from bad ﬁrms rather by pooling with good ﬁrms.11 Since cheating is equilibrium behavior
for some types in the separating approach, this assumption allows us to provide an intuitive
analysis of how individuals respond to unexpected opportunism. All of our results are for
the limiting case as ε goes to zero so we typically suppress explicit reference to ε.
Our main equilibrium concept is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian [Nash] equilibrium,
10The assumption that a ﬁrm can only go bad in a period in which it trades keeps the probability that
the ﬁrm has gone bad from accumulating between trades. Since we are interested in small ε this technical
assumption does not aﬀect the intuition of the model. Alternatively, one could allow for a small chance in
each period that the ﬁrm transitions back to being a normal ﬁrm.
11The pooling approach assumption that some types are “good” has its origins in ﬁnitely repeated games
where, unlike in our inﬁnitely repeated game, it is necessary to generate cooperation if the stage game has a
unique equilibrium without cooperation (Kreps et al., 1982; Fudenberg and Levine, 1989). The assumption
is the basis for the Cole and Kehoe (1998) analysis of reputation spillover.
8i.e., in each continuation game the strategies for each player maximize payoﬀs given beliefs,
and beliefs are consistent with strategies along the equilibrium path. We also consider a
coalition-proofness reﬁnement of such equilibria which allows for joint deviations by players
that help those players at any point in the game. As discussed later, the probability ε of
the ﬁrm going bad makes renegotiation of planned punishment strategies less attractive and
thereby allows intuitive equilibria based on trigger strategies to survive coalition-proofness.
In the trust literature it is typical to concentrate on the no-trust strategy in which no
individual ever trusts the ﬁrm and the (grim) trigger strategy in which trust stops if the ﬁrm
ever cheats an individual. We refer to the standard trigger strategy as the solidarity trigger
strategy and we deﬁne the discriminatory trigger strategy as the case where an individual
trusts the ﬁr mi fa n do n l yi ft h eﬁrm has never cheated anyone of her own type.
Deﬁnition 1 Under the no-trust strategy an individual never trusts the ﬁrm.
Deﬁnition 2 Under the solidarity trigger strategy the individual trusts a ﬁrm if and only
if the ﬁrm has never cheated anyone.
Deﬁnition 3 Under the discriminatory trigger strategy the individual trusts the ﬁrm if
and only if the ﬁrm has never cheated anyone of the same type.
We focus on equilibria that are type-stationary in that equilibrium strategies, while they
might depend on the type of the individual, do not depend on other features of the game
such as the period or sequence of play. Non-stationary equilibria can also exist, e.g., every
third individual is cheated, but only on Tuesdays. In evaluating equilibria we will consider
any possible deviations, but we will focus on equilibria that are type-stationary.
First considering the no-trust strategy, in the corresponding no-trust equilibrium we
deﬁne a normal ﬁrm’s strategy as to cheat any individual for any history. Clearly this is an
equilibrium since individuals will never trust if they expect to be cheated by the ﬁrm, and
the ﬁrm loses nothing from always cheating if it is never trusted. Regarding the solidarity
trigger strategy, in the corresponding solidarity-trust equilibrium we deﬁne a normal ﬁrm’s
s t r a t e g ya st ob ef a i rt oe v e r yi n d i v i d u a li fn oi ndividual has ever been cheated, and to cheat
every individual if an individual has ever been cheated. Since an individual trusts the ﬁrm
if and only if it has never cheated and since treating the individual fairly maintains the fair
reputation, the value Vs of a reputation for being fair when individuals follow the solidarity
trigger strategy is Vs =1−α+δVs or Vs =( 1−α)/(1−δ), where recall that ε is suppressed
9since we are considering the limit as ε goes to zero. Individuals will not trade when a ﬁrm
has a reputation for cheating, so the value to the ﬁrm of such a reputation is 0.T h eﬁrm
receives 1 − β from cheating, so the discount factor δs such that a (normal) ﬁrm is just






Since Vs is increasing in δ, the solidarity equilibrium exists if and only if δ>δ s.12
Now suppose type p follows the discriminatory trigger strategy and type q, expecting to
be cheated, follows the no-trust strategy. For the corresponding q-discrimination equilibrium
we deﬁne a normal ﬁrm’s strategy as to cheat any member of group q for any history, to
be fair to any member of group p if a member of group p has never been cheated, and
otherwise (oﬀ the equilibrium path) to cheat any member of group p.L e tVp be the value
of a reputation for treating members of group p fairly. Since in each round there is a γp
and a γq chance of encountering a member of group p or q respectively, and since members
of group q do not trust, Vp = γp(1 − α)+γq · 0+δVp or Vp = γpVs. Given this reputation
value, the discount factor δp such that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between between being fair to
and cheating a q individual is given by 1 − α + δpVp =1− β or
δp =
α − β
α − β + γp(1 − α)
. (2)
Since Vp is increasing in δ, this discrimination equilibrium exists if and only if δ>δ p.
Finally consider the case where both types of individuals follow the discriminatory trig-
ger strategy and a normal ﬁrm’s strategy is to be fair to every individual if no individual
has ever been cheated, and to cheat every individual if an individual has ever been cheated.
Following the above logic, if δ>δ p for p = x,y then each group is suﬃciently large to deter
opportunism even though it receives no help from the other group. We refer to this as the
independent-trust equilibrium.
In a type-stationary equilibrium an individual either invests and is treated fairly or does
not trust at all. Therefore any type-stationary equilibrium must be equivalent to one of the
above equilibria in the sense that the outcomes are the same even if the oﬀ-equilibrium-path
strategies diﬀer.13 Noting that the solidarity-trust equilibrium has the same equilibrium
12We use the strict rather than weak inequality because for any ε>0 the ﬁrm has an incentive to cheat
for δ = δs. For the same reason we use strict inequalities in other cutoﬀsd e ﬁned below.
13For instance, it is equivalent to the solidarity equilibrium for individuals to only penalize the ﬁrm for a
10Figure 2: Equilibrium ranges for β = 1
3, c = 1
2, α = 2
3 and γx = 3
4.
outcomes as the independent-trust equilibrium under our current assumptions, we ﬁnd the
following:
Proposition 1 Any type-stationary equilibrium is equivalent to: i) the no-trust equilib-
rium if δ ∈ (0,δs]; ii) either the no-trust or solidarity-trust equilibrium if δ ∈ (δs,δx];
iii) either the no-trust, solidarity-trust, or y-discrimination equilibrium if δ ∈ (δx,δy];a n d
iv) either the no-trust, solidarity-trust, x-discrimination, or y-discrimination equilibrium if
δ ∈ (δy,1).
Proof: In the Appendix.
suﬃciently long period that the ﬁrm does not cheat in equilibrium. In a noisy environment such strategies
can outperform the trigger strategies we consider (e.g., Green and Porter (1984), but in our model there is
no gain to limiting the punishment period.
11Looking at the top section of Figure 2, in the range δ ∈ (δs,δx] the ﬁrm is relatively
impatient so the two groups depend on each other to punish opportunism and trust by
either group is only possible in the solidarity-trust equilibrium. However, for δ ∈ (δx,δy]
the ﬁrm is patient enough that the majority is capable of dissuading opportunism against
its members without the help of the minority, so discrimination becomes possible. For
δ ∈ (δy,1) the ﬁrm is so patient that even the minority alone can dissuade opportunism
against its members, so in this range an equilibrium also exists where the minority trusts
the ﬁrm but the majority does not because its members do not coordinate on a strategy of
punishing opportunism. Notice that δp is strictly decreasing in γp, so this pattern in the
Figure that discrimination against the minority is supported by a wider range of discount
factors must hold.
Corollary 1 The range of δ supporting a p-discrimination equilibrium is larger than the
range supporting a q-discrimination equilibrium iﬀ γp <γ q.
As the minority population γy becomes smaller, δx falls toward δs while δy rises toward
1, so the range in which the y-discrimination equilibrium is the unique discrimination equi-
librium increases to cover the entire range of the solidarity-trust, equilibrium. That is, as
the population sizes become more diﬀerent, the range (δs,δx] under which the two groups
depend on each other to achieve fairness and the range (δy,1) under which they do not need
each other at all both shrink, while the range (δx,δy] under which only one group needs the
other expands. Conversely, as the population sizes become more similar, the range (δx,δy]
shrinks and outside of this range either both groups have to rely on each other to dissuade
opportunism or each group alone is large enough to dissuade opportunism.
While this result captures the basic insight of opportunistic discrimination, the Nash
restriction to individual deviations in perfect Bayesian equilibria allows for some equilibria
that seem less likely than others. For instance, for δ>δ s the solidarity equilibrium always
coexists with the no-trust equilibrium and it oﬀers strictly higher payoﬀs for every player.
Since it is in the interest of everyone to collectively switch to the “good” equilibrium, it is
often argued that the players should be able to talk their way to it. Similarly, for δ>δ y,
either group can stop opportunism against its members by following the discriminatory
trigger strategy of only punishing opportunism against its own members. Since a discrimi-
nation equilibrium in this range arises only because the group following a no-trust strategy
does not collectively switch to a trigger strategy even though they would all beneﬁt, this
equilibrium also seems less likely.
12Such arguments cannot completely eliminate ineﬃcient equilibria. Consider the y-
discrimination equilibrium in the range δ ∈ (δx,δy]. The solidarity equilibrium also exists
in this range and both the y individuals and the ﬁrm are better oﬀ in it. However, the dif-
ference from the previous cases is that the y’s and the ﬁrm alone cannot induce a change to
this better equilibrium, but are dependent on the x’s changing their strategy to the solidar-
ity strategy. Since the x’s are already doing as well as they can in the current equilibrium,
it is unclear why they would switch.14 This highlights a key diﬀerence between the position
of the minority and majority. Since the minority interacts with the ﬁrm infrequently they
can escape the discrimination equilibrium only if the majority adopts the solidarity strategy
or if the ﬁrm is very patient. In contrast, the majority interacts with the ﬁrm frequently
enough that it is in the interest of the ﬁrm to treat them fairly based on the punishment
strategy of the majority alone.
This idea that an equilibrium should be ruled out if a coalition of players can attain
higher payoﬀs through a joint deviation appears in diﬀerent reﬁnements of Nash equilibria,
most notably in the diﬀerent notions of coalition-proofness (e.g., Bernheim et al., 1987;
Bernheim and Ray, 1989).15 To capture the eﬀect of joint deviations in the simplest way,
we say a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or just “equilibrium”) is coalition proof if there
does not exist in any period and any history another perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the
continuation game attainable by a joint deviation of a subset of players such that every
player in the subset expects to be strictly better oﬀ given their beliefs where these beliefs are
consistent along the equilibrium path. Note that any deviation must be to an equilibrium,
but this equilibrium need not itself be coalition proof.16 For our game the relevant deviation
in each case is to an equilibrium which is itself immune to any deviations by any coalition
to another equilibrium, so “weaker” notions of coalition-proofness would also allow such
14Not only do they gain nothing from switching to the new equilibrium, they lose all gains to trade if there
is a “miscommunication” and the ﬁrm does not change its strategy and cheats the minority, or if there is
any uncertainty over whether or not the minority was really cheated.
15Early approaches to joint deviations, including strong equilibria (Aumann, 1959) and strong perfect
equilibria (Rubinstein, 1978) did not require that deviations be immune to further deviations. The various
deﬁnitions of coalition-proofness in the literature require that deviations be immune to further deviations to
some degree, but there is no consensus on which deﬁnitions are most appropriate when. As discussed below,
the incentive for further deviations does not arise in our context so these diﬀerences are not relevant for our
analysis.
16Milgrom and Roberts (1996) refer to this concept as “strong coalition-proofness” since more deviations
are potentially allowed, thereby potentially eliminating more equilibria. Since this deﬁnition of coalition
proofness is not recursive it can be applied directly to our inﬁnitely repeated game.
13deviations.
As we show in the following proposition, coalition-proofness limits the multiplicity
of equilibria in Proposition 1 in accordance with the above discussion. Note that since
coalition-proofness allows a coalition to be formed at any period, it incorporates the possi-
bility of renegotiating a planned punishment strategy following unexpected opportunism by
the ﬁrm.17 Allowing for a small probability ε that the ﬁrm becomes inept implies that indi-
viduals interpret unexpected cheating as a negative signal about the ﬁrm, thereby ensuring
that trigger strategies are credible.18
Proposition 2 Any coalition-proof, type-stationary equilibrium is payoﬀ equivalent to: i)
the no-trust equilibrium if δ ∈ (0,δs]; ii) the y-discrimination equilibrium or the solidarity-
trust equilibrium if δ ∈ (δx,δy]; and iii) the solidarity-trust equilibrium if δ ∈ (δs,δx]∪(δy,1).
Proof: In the Appendix.
Looking at the middle section of Figure 2, in the lower range δ ∈ (δs,δx] the ﬁrm is still
relatively impatient, so any division between the individuals will make everyone worse oﬀ.
Therefore the whole coalition of individuals can successfully adopt a punishment strategy
that induces fairness by the ﬁrm, but not any one group alone. For the higher range
δ ∈ (δy,1) the ﬁrm is suﬃciently patient that if either group switches from the no-trust
strategy to either the discriminatory trigger strategy or the solidarity-trust strategy the
ﬁrm has an incentive to be fair to them regardless of what individuals in the other group
do, so any equilibrium is payoﬀ equivalent to the solidarity-trust equilibrium. Only in the
range δ ∈ (δx,δy] is discrimination possible, and it must be directed against the minority.
The following corollary of Proposition 2 follows.
Corollary 2 A coalition-proof p-discrimination equilibrium exists for some δ iﬀ γp <γ q.
Whether coalition-proofness is an appropriate reﬁnement presumably depends on the de-
tails of the situation such as the number of diﬀerent players, the ease of communication, the
17The coalition-proofness literature generalizes the renegotiation literature following Farrell and Maskin
(1989) which was for two players.
18Farrell and Weizsacker (2001) show that the standard trigger strategy in a trust game with complete
information is not renegotiation-proof. Moreover, unlike the case of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (van
Damme, 1989), there does not exist a more complicated equilibrium strategy that is payoﬀ-equivalent or
nearly so. Farrell and Weizsacker analyze a game between two players but the same issues arise in our game
with multiple individuals.
14willingness of players to change strategies, and the history of play in related contexts. Even
when we require equilibria to be coalition-proof, the solidarity-trust and y−discrimination
equilibria coexist in the range δ ∈ (δx,δy] because a switch to the solidarity-trust equilib-
rium means that x’s have to agree to punish opportunism against the y’s even though they
themselves can only lose from lost trade with the ﬁrm. We now show how this problem of
getting x’s to punish opportunism against y’s is exacerbated if ﬁrms are with some small
probability biased.
2.1 Renegotiation and bias
Following Becker (1957), a large literature examines discrimination when ﬁrms have a
preference-based bias. To integrate this approach with that of opportunistic discrimina-
tion, consider how equilibrium behavior is aﬀected when there is some chance that the ﬁrm
is not proﬁt-maximizing but instead has a bias against members of one group. We model
this as a small independent probability φp that the ﬁrm has a preference to cheat group
p. We look at the case where the probability of bias is low enough that each group will
still trust the ﬁrm if “normal” ﬁrms who are neither inept nor biased do not cheat, i.e.,
(1 − ε)(1 − φp)(α − c) ≥ (φp + ε − φpε)(c − β). Since we are interested in the limiting case
where ε goes to zero, we therefore assume 0 <φ p < (α−c)/(α−β) for p = x,y.N o t i c et h a t
we are assuming that there is some chance of the ﬁrm being biased against either group,
not just against the minority.
The potential for such bias does not change the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria identi-
ﬁed in Proposition 1, but it does eﬀect the set of equilibria that satisfy coalition-proofness.
After cheating a member of one group the ﬁrm might want to persuade members of the
other group that they will not meet the same fate so they should still trust the ﬁrm. This is
a problem for the minority in the range δ ∈ (δx,δy] because they are dependent on the ma-
jority to credibly threaten to punish the ﬁrm for opportunism against anyone, including the
minority. If the majority believes that the ﬁrm is biased against the minority rather than
inept, it has an incentive to the give the ﬁrm another chance. In contrast, the majority is
only dependent on the minority in the range δ ∈ (δs,δx] where both groups depend on each
other, so the minority does not beneﬁt from forgiving opportunism against the majority.
Therefore, even though we allow for bias against either group, the eﬀect of bias is always
against the minority.
15Proposition 3 With a potentially biased ﬁrm, any coalition-proof type-stationary equilib-
rium is equivalent to: i) the no-trust equilibrium if δ ∈ [0,δs]; ii) the solidarity-trust equi-
librium if δ ∈ (δs,δx]; iii) the y-discrimination equilibrium if δ ∈ (δx,δy];a n di v )t h e
independent-trust equilibrium if δ ∈ (δy,1).
Proof: In the Appendix.
This proposition shows that preference-based bias among a small proportion of players
can have a large impact in choosing between multiple equilibria.19 If the majority starts
with a solidarity strategy of punishing opportunism against the minority, not only will
biased ﬁrms still cheat the minority, but unbiased ﬁrms have an incentive to pool with
biased ﬁrms and thereby gain the short-term beneﬁts of cheating while maintaining the
long-term beneﬁts of a good reputation with the majority.
This pooling incentive to mimic biased ﬁrms contrasts with the intuition of political
correctness (Morris, 2001) in which unbiased advisors maintain their reputation by some-
times refraining from expressing opinions which happen to match those of biased advisors.
Similar incentives might arise in this model by allowing for uncertainty over whether an
act of opportunism occurred. For instance a very patient ﬁrm which is not discriminatory
might try to avoid even the appearance of being opportunistic against the minority for fear
of damaging its reputation.20
2.2 Contractual and legal constraints on opportunism
To see how contractual and legal constraints on opportunism can interact with reputation
eﬀects, and how anti-discrimination laws can aﬀect opportunistic discrimination, we con-
sider three enforcement strategies against opportunism. First, the government can pursue
one-sided enforcement that selectively discourages opportunism against one group. Second,
the government can more rigorously enforce contracts and laws against opportunism in
general, narrowing the range for all opportunism, discriminatory or not. Third, the gov-
ernment can pursue anti-discrimination enforcement which penalizes opportunism against a
member of any group if and only if the ﬁrm is also fair toward a member of another group.
19In an assurance game Basu (2005) similarly ﬁnds that a fraction of biased types who do not cooperate
can induce non-biased types to also play the non-cooperation strategy, though the incentive is primarily
defensive rather than opportunistic.
20As Smith (1766) stated, “...a prudent dealer, who is sensible of his real interest, would rather choose
to lose what he has a right to than give any ground for suspicion.”
16To analyze this problem we use the result from Proposition 2 on the set of coalition-proof
equilibria, though the general insights still hold if we think about the potential for discrim-
ination against the minority but not the majority in the range δ ∈ (δx,δy] from Proposition
1.
Let πp be the penalty imposed on a ﬁrm if it engages in opportunism against group
p. This penalty could be for breaking a private contract or for breaking laws against
opportunism. We assume that πp <α− β so the penalty does not simply eliminate all
opportunism against p but rather allows for some interaction between the penalty and
reputation eﬀects. Noting that Vs is unchanged from the base model, and that the marginal
ﬁrm will cheat an individual for which the penalty is lowest, the cutoﬀ for the solidarity
equilibrium is δπ
s such that 1 − α + δπ
sVs =1− β − min{πx,πy},o r
δπ
s =
α − β − min{πx,πy}
1 − β − min{πx,πy}
. (3)
Regarding discrimination equilibria, Vp is also unchanged from the base model, so when
p individuals follow the discriminatory trigger strategy and q individuals follow the no-trust
strategy, the cutoﬀ discount factor for cheating p is δπ





α − β − πp
α − β + γp(1 − α) − πp
(4)
We can now use these cutoﬀs just as in the previous analysis. In particular, it is straight-
forward to show that the ranges for coalition-proof equilibria will be the same as given in
Proposition 2, except with these penalty-adjusted cutoﬀs.
When enforcement is selective it is often aimed at protecting the majority rather than
minority (πx > 0, πy =0 ), e.g., foreigners in many countries have limited access to the legal
system to enforce contracts, and in some countries women are still unable to sign binding
contracts. Such enforcement would seem to only beneﬁt the majority, but in fact it can
hurt the minority by reducing the dependence of the majority on reputational sanctions
against opportunism. To see this, note that an increase in πx decreases δπ
x but does not
have an impact on δπ
s or δπ
y so the lower solidarity equilibrium region (δπ
s,δπ
x] shrinks and
the y-discrimination region (δπ
x,δπ
y] increases. Since the majority is better able to protect
itself without relying on a solidarity strategy with the minority, the minority is made more
vulnerable to opportunism. Therefore enforcement is not just a substitute for reputation,
but undermines reputation so much that there is a net loss in trade. Only if πx is higher
17than π∗
x =( α−β)γy, which is the point in Figure 3 where δπ
x(πx)=δπ
s(0),d o e sδπ
x become
smaller than δπ
s, in which case the majority is better oﬀ and the minority is not hurt.
In some cases the policy response to discrimination might involve selective enforcement
that is targeted at opportunism against the minority (πx =0 , πy > 0). This can eliminate
the y-discrimination equilibrium if δ ∈ (δπ
y,δy] and it cannot cause a switch into the y-
discrimination region since it does not aﬀect δπ
x. However, it too can be counterproductive.
If πy is higher than
π∗




w h i c hi st h ep o i n ti nF i g u r e3w h e r eδπ
y(πy)=δπ
x(0),t h e nδπ
y <δ x so a reverse discrimination
equilibrium becomes possible if δ ∈ (δπ
y,δx]. Since the solidarity equilibrium would only
survive in the region δ ∈ (δs,δx],t h i si san e tl o s sf o rδ ∈ (max{δs,δπ
y},δx].I nF i g u r e3t h i s




Now consider general enforcement against opportunism where the penalties are the
same, πx = πy = π>0.S i n c eδπ
s and δπ
p are decreasing in π, general enforcement decreases
all the cutoﬀsa ss e e ni nF i g u r e3 . I fδ ∈ (δπ
s,δs] then general enforcement induces a
switch from the no-trust region to a region where only the solidarity equilibrium survives.
And if δ ∈ (δπ
y,δy] then it induces a switch from the y-discrimination region to a region
where only the solidarity equilibrium survives. But if δ ∈ (δπ
x,δx] then general enforcement
perversely induces a switch from a region where only the solidarity equilibrium survives to
the region where the y-discrimination equilibrium survives. Without any enforcement the x
individuals would have to follow the solidarity strategy to avoid the no-trust equilibrium, but
the combination of reputation and explicit sanctions make it possible for the x individuals
to follow the discriminatory trigger strategy and not be cheated.
The ﬁnal option is to penalize opportunism against one group if and only if the ﬁrm
is also fair towards the other group. This “anti-discrimination enforcement” has the same
eﬀect as enforcement targeted at opportunism against the minority at decreasing δπ
y,21 ex-
cept that reverse discrimination cannot result even if the penalty is higher than π∗
y because
discrimination against y’s will also be penalized. Therefore the original y-discrimination
region disappears, an x-discrimination region is not created, and only the solidarity equi-
librium survives for δ>δ s. Comparing these diﬀerent enforcement strategies, we have the
following result.
21I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrm ﬁrst cheats an individual from one group and is subsequently fair to an
individual from another group, the penalty should be imposed with interest to main the exact correspondence.
18Figure 3: General, one-sided, and anti-discriminatory enforcement.
Proposition 4 Anti-discrimination enforcement is the only enforcement strategy that never
allows for increased opportunism in a coalition-proof type-stationary equilibrium.
This analysis adds to the long-standing debate on whether legal and reputational sanc-
tions against opportunism are substitutes or complements (e.g. Ostrom, 2000; Poppo and
Zenger, 2002; Lazzarini et al., 2004). Anti-discrimination enforcement is a complement to
reputation since it makes punishment strategies more eﬀective at stopping opportunism
over a larger set of discount factors, but the other forms of enforcement can make reputa-
tion more or less eﬀective depending on the parameter values. Of particular relevance for
understanding discrimination, stronger enforcement that protects the majority never helps
the minority and often makes it worse oﬀ, so from the perspective of the minority such
enforcement is worse than just being a substitute for reputation.
2.3 Self-segregation and self-integration
The model assume that individuals appear before a single ﬁrm according to a stochastic
mechanism beyond their control, but if there are multiple ﬁrms in a market then individuals
that anticipate being cheated at one ﬁr mm i g h tc h o o s et og ot oa n o t h e rﬁrm. In particular,
individuals who are in the minority at diﬀerent ﬁrms might ﬁnd it worthwhile to concentrate
their business in one ﬁrm where their numbers are suﬃcient to avoid opportunism. This
could represent “self-segregation” where each group concentrates its business on ﬁrms which
19do not do business with the other group, or it could represent “self-integration” where both
groups concentrate their business on ﬁrms which do business with both groups.22
To investigate this issue we assume that there are m>1 ﬁrms with discount factors
δi, i =1 ,2,...,m.E a c hﬁrm i does business with ni
p ≤ np members of each group where
Pm
i=1 ni





p = n. Following the same approach as the single ﬁrm
case, in any period the probability that ﬁrm i does business with a member of group p
is γi
p = ni
p/n. To simplify the analysis we again focus on the result from Proposition
3 on coalition-proof equilibria when the ﬁrm is potentially biased. Following the same











α − β + γi
p(1 − α)
.
The following proposition shows that, unless a ﬁrm is known to be biased, individuals are
never better oﬀ from self-segregation than from “full self-integration” where all individuals
patronize the same ﬁrm. If the minority is distributed across diﬀerent ﬁrms and their
numbers at each ﬁrm make the cutoﬀ δi
p too high to ensure ensure fair treatment, then
minority individuals can sometimes beneﬁt from joining other minority members at the
same ﬁrm. However, in this case the minority does just as well by patronizing a ﬁrm which
is also patronized by the majority, including the case of full self-integration. And if the
minority is insuﬃcient to ensure fair treatment even when it is fully concentrated on one
ﬁrm, then it is no worse oﬀ, and sometimes better oﬀ, under full self-integration since the
cutoﬀ δi
s m i g h tb es u ﬃciently low to allow for the solidarity equilibrium.23 Therefore, as
proven in the Appendix, the following proposition follows.
Proposition 5 Full self-integration oﬀers equal or better expected outcomes for all individ-
uals than self-segregation in a coalition-proof, type-stationary equilibrium.
22For simplicity this paper assumes that the gains from trade are ﬁxed so we do not investigate the role
of competition between ﬁrms. Competition increases the costs of a bad reputation (Horner, 2002), but also
reduces the rents from a good reputation, so its eﬀects on trust are ambiguous (Bar-Isaac, 2005). The eﬀect
on opportunistic discrimination is therefore likely to be sensitive to the exact environment.
23Sometimes partial integration is better for the minority than full integration. For instance, suppose there
are two ﬁrms and the combined size of the majority and minority puts ﬁrm 1 in the solidarity equilibrium









x], then full integration newly exposes the minority in ﬁrm 1 to the discrimination equilibrium.
20Preference-based models of discrimination following Becker (1957) predict that workers
self-segregate into diﬀerent ﬁrms. In our model of opportunistic discrimination workers
beneﬁtf r o ma v o i d i n gﬁrms that are known to be biased, but otherwise there is strength
in numbers, even when the numbers involve members of another group. The gains from
self-integration may oﬀer insight into the potential for fairer treatment by large corporate
employers and retailers than by smaller proprietorships and partnerships.24 Because of
more frequent business, a large ﬁrm might be fair to all individuals when a small ﬁrm is not
fair to even a subpopulation which it specializes in serving. For instance, a large retailer
like Wal-Mart may be more likely than a small local store to replace a defective product
from a minority customer, even if that store’s customers are primarily minorities.
2.4 Reputation unravelling with uncertain discount factors
So far we have considered the standard repeated trust game where the ﬁrm’s discount factor
δ is common knowledge, except for the small probability that the ﬁrm is so inept or myopic
that it always cheats. But in many cases individuals have to decide whether to trust the ﬁrm
while facing substantial uncertainty over how patient the ﬁrm is. This can be a problem
for the minority in particular s i n c ee v e nr e l a t i v e l yp a t i e n tﬁrms might still discriminate
against them. To gain insight into this issue we assume that it is common knowledge that
the ﬁrm’s discount factor is distributed according to the distribution F(δ) but the exact
value is the ﬁrm’s private information. We are interested in the case where this distribution
is relatively favorable so that it is an equilibrium for individuals to trade with the ﬁrm
until they learn from the ﬁrm’s actions that the ﬁrm is too impatient to be trusted. For
simplicity we assume ε =0and φp =0in this ﬁnal section.
Regarding the no-trust and solidarity-trust equilibria, the situation is little diﬀerent
from the standard case. Clearly if F(δs) is high enough the no-trust equilibrium will be
the only equilibrium, and if F(δs) is low enough the solidarity-trust equilibrium will exist.
In particular it is an equilibrium for individuals to follow the solidarity trigger strategy if
the expected gain from the ﬁrm being fair when δ ≥ δs is enough to compensate for the
expected loss from being cheated when δ<δ s, i.e., if (1 − F(δs))(α − c) ≥ F(δs)(β − c).
In this equilibrium ﬁrms with δ<δ s will immediately reveal themselves by cheating, while
ﬁrms with δ ≥ δs will be fair.
24The idea that integration facilitates trust by creating a higher cost of cheating is related to the idea that
multi-market contact between ﬁrms can sometimes facilitate collusion (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
21The interesting case arises regarding discrimination. Our previous calculation of δp still
reﬂects the diﬀerential incentive to cheat the minority. Since individuals do not know δ,
the minority will trade with the ﬁrm that has no history of interaction with the minority
if the expected payoﬀ is positive, i.e., if (1 − F(δy))(α − c) ≥ F(δy)(β − c).T h em a j o r i t y
makes a similar calculation but there is an additional concern. Once a ﬁrm has cheated a
y individual the value of its reputation has been diminished because y individuals will no
longer trade with it. Therefore a ﬁrm might ﬁrst be fair to an x, then cheat the ﬁrst y and
then cheat the next x that is encountered. By spending down its reputation in this way,
the ﬁrm can cheat twice rather than only once.
The following proposition shows that this strategy of “double-crossing” the x individuals
can be an equilibrium strategy for all ﬁrms δ ∈ [δd,δx) for some 0 <δ d <δ s where the
exact value of δd is derived as part of the proof in the Appendix. The only requirements are
that the distribution of ﬁrms is suﬃciently favorable that x and y individuals are willing to
trade initially and that x individuals are still willing to trade after observing a y individual
being cheated.
Proposition 6 If F(δy),F(δx)/F(δy) ≤ (α − c)/(α − β) then there exists an equilibrium
such that x’s follow the discriminatory trigger strategy, y’s follow the solidarity trigger
strategy, and i) the ﬁrm cheats everyone for δ ∈ (0,δd), ii) the ﬁrm treats all x’s fairly until
it encounters a y whereupon it cheats everyone for δ ∈ [δd,δx), iii) the ﬁrm treats all x’s
fairly and cheats all y’s for δ ∈ [δx,δy),a n di v )t h eﬁrm treats everyone fairly for δ ∈ [δy,1).
Regarding the eﬀect of group sizes, since δx converges to δy as γx − γy goes to zero,
and since (α − c)/(α − β) < 1, the last condition implies that the diﬀerence in group
sizes must be suﬃciently large for the equilibrium to exist. Also since δx <δ y and hence
F(δy)/F(δx) > 1, the condition implies that the equivalent equilibrium in which the ma-
jority is discriminated against does not exist. Hence the general pattern is consistent with
that of Proposition 2 even though we have not restricted our analysis to coalition-proof
equilibria.
Recall that in the standard model all ﬁrms are better oﬀ in the solidarity equilibrium
than in the no-trust or discrimination equilibria. Although ﬁrms in the discriminatory
region [δx,δy) are better oﬀ ex post from discrimination if a y individual trusts them and
x individuals continue to trade with them, in equilibrium y individuals do not trust the
ﬁrm. In this extension where there is real uncertainty over the ﬁrm’s discount factor, y
individuals will initially trust the ﬁrm in the discrimination equilibrium, so ﬁrms which
22cheat them beneﬁt both ex ante and ex post from the discrimination equilibrium relative
to the solidarity equilibrium. Firms in the region [δd,δx) beneﬁt even more since they can
cheat twice, so it is only ﬁrms in the region [δy,1) that do not beneﬁt from the discrimination
equilibrium.
This model oﬀers insight into how failure to stand up to opportunism against the mi-
nority can eventually endanger even the majority.25 Once the ﬁrm has cheated the minority
and lost γy share of its business, the value of its reputation is devalued because cheating the
majority will now result in only a loss of the remaining γx share of business, rather than of
all business if it had cheated the majority from the beginning. Once opportunism against
anyone begins, it becomes more likely against everyone.
3C o n c l u s i o n
In a standard repeated trust game, we ﬁnd that the minority is more susceptible to oppor-
tunism than the majority. Such opportunistic discrimination does not require discriminatory
preferences nor diﬀerences in individual attributes. Rather it follows from the simple fact
that the minority is by deﬁnition smaller so trade with the minority is correspondingly less
frequent. Long-standing theories about trust and reputation dating back to Smith (1766)
then imply that there is less value in a reputation for honesty toward the minority, so there
is correspondingly less incentive to forego the short-term gains of cheating them. Repu-
tation spillover can protect the minority if the majority is expected to follow a solidarity
strategy of punishing opportunism against anyone, but the majority does not gain from
such a strategy unless it is also so small that both groups depend on each other to dissuade
opportunism.
Any population can be divided in a myriad of ways, such as gender, ethnicity, race,
language, caste, religion, etc. From the perspective of our analysis, whether a particular
division aﬀects trust depends on how people are expected to react to opportunism, so the
question is what divisions are “focal” for historical or other reasons. Clearly one possibility
is that preference-based biases among some players might make particular divisions focal.
When a ﬁr mm i g h th a v ead i s c r i m i n a tory preference to cheat the minority based on some
division, we ﬁnd the stronger result that such biases interact with reputational concerns
25The majority would like to commit to a solidarity strategy, but once a ﬁrm has cheated the minority
the majority can still be better oﬀ in expectation from renegotiating with the ﬁrm than from stopping all
trade. We do not formally model renegotiation in this section.
23to make discrimination the unique coalition-proof equilibrium for ﬁrms of intermediate
patience. Hence the existence of such bias in a society, even if not widespread, may help
explain why some divisions have a large eﬀect on trust and others do not.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The text shows that any type-stationary perfect Bayesian equi-
libria [PBE] is outcome-equivalent to one of the indicated equilibria for the given ranges
of δ.W en o wc o n ﬁrm that the given equilibria are PBE by examining whether any player
beneﬁts from changing their strategies in reaction to an observed deviation.
We begin with the no-trust equilibrium. Individuals follow the no-trust strategy. Given
the opportunity, the ﬁrm always cheats. Take any possible history. Since individuals believe
that the ﬁrm will always cheat, trust yields a payoﬀ of β − c<0 but a payoﬀ of 0 if they
do not trust. Thus individuals cannot gain by trusting the ﬁrm. On the other hand, since
individuals never trust, it is a best response for the ﬁrm to cheat the individual.
Next consider the solidarity-trust equilibrium. All individuals follow the solidarity strat-
egy. The ﬁrm always treats the individual fairly as long as the ﬁrm has never cheated. Take
any possible history. If the history involves only trust and no cheating, the individual
expects the ﬁrm to treat her fairly so the short-run payoﬀ to an individual who trusts is
α − c>0 and the payoﬀ to an individual who does not trust is 0. Thus the individual
prefers to trust the ﬁrm. For the ﬁrm, treating the individual fairly yields payoﬀ 1−α+δVs
and cheating the individual yields payoﬀ 1 − β. Whenever δ>δ s, 1 − α + δVs > 1 − β so
the ﬁrm is better of treating the individual fairly. Whenever δ ≤ δs, 1 − α + δVs < 1 − β
so the ﬁrm is better oﬀ cheating the individual. If instead, the ﬁrm has cheated then the
individuals and the ﬁrm play the “no-trust equilibrium” and the above argument holds.
Finally consider the p-discrimination equilibrium. When the ﬁrm faces an individual
from population p, the argument is the same as under the no-trust equilibrium — the ﬁrm
has no incentive to treat a p type individual fairly as it expects no trust in the future and
a p type individual never trusts the ﬁrm because she expects to be cheated. When the
ﬁrm faces an individual from population q, if the history involves no cheating between the
ﬁrm and individuals from population q, for the individual, the argument is precisely the
same as for the solidarity equilibrium. For the ﬁrm, treating the type q individual fairly
yields payoﬀ Vq and cheating yields 1 − β. Whenever δ>δ q the ﬁrm prefers to treat the q
individual fairly, but if δ ≤ δq then 1 − α + δVq < 1 − β so the ﬁrm is better oﬀ cheating
24the individual. If the history involves cheating, then the ﬁrm and all individuals switch to
the “no-trust equilibrium” and the same argument holds. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 1 gives the set of type-stationary PBE. We now
show which of these equilibria are also coalition proof.
i) For δ ∈ (0,δs] from Proposition 1 the only PBE is the no-trust equilibrium. Similarly
for any history the only PBE of any subgame is also the no-trust equilibrium, so there is
no deviation to another PBE which can ever improve on the no-trust equilibrium for any
set of players. Therefore the no-trust equilibrium is coalition proof.
ii) For δ ∈ (δx,δy] from Proposition 1 the no-trust, solidarity, and y-discrimination
equilibria are the only type-stationary PBE. The no-trust equilibrium is not coalition-proof
since all players are better oﬀ switching to the solidarity equilibrium. Regarding the soli-
darity equilibrium, the only deviation in any subgame that can beneﬁta n yp l a y e ri si ft h e
ﬁrm cheats. But if a ﬁrm ever deviates and cheats, then the only consistent belief for indi-
viduals is that the ﬁrm has become inept, so individuals have no incentive to change their
equilibrium strategy of not trusting the ﬁrm after any cheating, and the ﬁrm is worse oﬀ.
Therefore there does not exist in any subgame a deviation to a PBE that improves on the
solidarity equilibrium for any player, implying the solidarity equilibrium is coalition proof.
Now consider the y-discrimination equilibrium. First, just as in the solidarity equilibrium,
cheating an x will lead individuals to infer the ﬁrm has become inept so based on cheating
of an x there does not exist in any subgame a deviation to a PBE that improves on the
discrimination equilibrium for any of players. Now consider deviations that involve trust
between the ﬁrm and some or all of the y’s. Since x’s can never improve on their payoﬀsb y
deviating from the discrimination strategy, this coalition does not involve any x’s. But if
x’s stick with the discrimination strategy, we know that for δ ≤ δy the ﬁrm always beneﬁts
from cheating a y individual in any subgame. Therefore there is no deviation to a PBE that
improves on the discrimination equilibrium for those players who deviate, so the equilibrium
is coalition proof.
iii-a) For δ ∈ (δs,δx] from Proposition 1 the no-trust and solidarity equilibria are the
only type-stationary PBE. By the same arguments as in ii) the former is not coalition proof
and the latter is.
iii-b) For δ ∈ (δy,1) from Proposition 1 the no-trust, solidarity, and the two discrimi-
nation equilibria are the only type-stationary PBE. By the same arguments as above the
25no-trust equilibrium is not coalition proof and the solidarity equilibrium is. Both discrim-
ination equilibria also exist but they are not coalition proof since the discriminated group
and the beneﬁt from a switch to the independent-trust equilibrium. In this equilibrium the
individuals do the best they can and the ﬁrm does better than from cheating as long as
δ>δ x,δy. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Under the assumption 0 <φ p < (α − c)/(α − β) for p = x,y,
individuals of type p will initially trust a ﬁrm if a normal ﬁrm’s strategy is not to cheat. If
a ﬁrm unexpectedly cheats a member of group p, then it could be that the ﬁrm is a biased
ﬁrm or an inept ﬁrm. We are interested in how this aﬀects the set of coalition-proof PBE
identiﬁed in Proposition 2. Since we are still interested in the limiting case as ε approaches
zero, the diﬀerent cutoﬀs are the same, and the only diﬀerence is with respect to beliefs
after histories that are oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path for normal ﬁrms.
i) For δ ∈ (0,δs], the equilibrium set is unaﬀected since for any history it is still a
dominant strategy for a normal ﬁrm to cheat any individual.
ii) For δ ∈ (δx,δy], ﬁrst consider the solidarity equilibrium. If the ﬁrm cheats the ﬁrst
y then, since φy(α − β) >ε (c − β) as ε goes to zero, the probability that the ﬁrm is biased
against y’s rather than inept is high enough that the x’s still have an incentive to renegotiate
away from the solidarity equilibrium to the y-discrimination equilibrium. This always holds
as ε goes to zero. Anticipating this, a ﬁrm that is neither inept nor biased against y’s
gets a payoﬀ of 1 − β + δVx from such a deviation. The ﬁrm will cheat the y whenever
this is greater than 1 − α + δVs. But after rearranging, this inequality is equivalent to
1−β>1−α+δγyVs =1−α+δVy, which holds whenever δ<δ y (equation (2)). Since all
ﬁrms will therefore pool and cheat the y, the solidarity equilibrium is not coalition proof.
Regarding the y-discrimination equilibrium, suppose the ﬁrm unexpectedly cheats an
x. Members of population x can only conclude that the ﬁrm has become inept so it is a
dominant strategy for each x to not trust the ﬁrm in the future, so there is no improving
joint deviation to a PBE, and the y-discrimination equilibrium is coalition proof.
iii-a) For δ ∈ (δs,δx), ﬁrst consider the solidarity equilibrium. If a ﬁrm cheats the ﬁrst
y then , since φy(α − β) >ε (c − β) as ε goes to zero, x individuals have an incentive to
form a coalition with the ﬁrm and continue trading. However, y types have a dominant
strategy of not trusting, and as shown in Proposition 1, if δ<δ x then the ﬁrm will cheat
any x individual in any subgame if x individuals alone can punish the ﬁrm, so there is
26no improving joint deviation to a PBE. Since δ>δ s,t h eﬁrm will never deviate in any
other fashion (cheat a subsequent y or cheat an x) because all individuals will conclude that
the ﬁrm is inept and never trust again. The no-trust equilibrium, in any history with no
cheating, can be improved on by a joint deviation of all players to the solidarity equilibrium
and is therefore not coalition-proof.
iii-b) For δ ∈ (δy,1), ﬁrst consider the solidarity equilibrium. If the ﬁrm cheats the ﬁrst
y it encounters then, since φy(α − β) >ε (c − β) as ε goes to zero, x individuals have an
incentive to form a coalition with the ﬁrm and continue trading. However, while the ﬁrm
beneﬁts relative to no trade in the subgame, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ for δ>δ p by not deviating
in the ﬁrst place so the deviation cannot be part of an improving joint deviation to a PBE.
Now consider a p-discrimination equilibrium. In either case, since δ>δ y >δ x there is
an improving joint deviation by the p’s and the ﬁr mt oaP B Ew h e r et h ep’s adopt either the
solidarity strategy or the discriminatory trigger strategy, either of which is payoﬀ equivalent
to the solidarity equilibrium. Finally, the no-trust equilibrium can be improved on by a
joint deviation of all players to the solidarity equilibrium. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :Under full integration all individuals patronize the same ﬁrm, in
which case the equilibrium ranges are as given by Proposition 3. A necessary condition for
another allocation to be better for some individual for some δ is there exists a ﬁrm i such that
either (i) δi
s <δ s,( i i )δi
x >δ x, or (iii) δi
y <δ y.I nt h eﬁrst case the solidarity region expands
downward, in the second case the discrimination region contracts from below, and in the
third case the discrimination region contracts from above. Checking these possibilities:
i) Since δs =( α − β)/(α − β +( 1− α)), δi
s =( α − β)/
¡
α − β + γi(1 − α)
¢
,a n dγi ≤
1,t h i si si m p o s s i b l e .
ii) This holds if γi
x <γ x.F o rt h ee q u i l i b r i u mt ob es e l f - s e g r e g a t i n gi tm u s tb et h a tγi
x =
0. But in this case δi
s ≥ δy, implying that even though the region of discrimination against
y has contracted (in fact, disappeared) the solidarity region has contracted so much that,
even if δ ∈ (δx,δy) so that there is room for a better outcome than under full integration,
it must be that δ<δ i
s, implying the no-trust equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for ﬁrm
i and no one beneﬁts relative to full integration.
iii) Since δy =( α − β)/
¡
α − β + γy(1 − α)
¢
, δi
y =( α − β)/
¡





y ≤ γy,t h i si si m p o s s i b l e . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :To fully specify strategies assume that following any deviation
27from the equilibrium path the ﬁrm always cheats and no individual trusts and the value
to the ﬁrm of going oﬀ the equilibrium path is 0. We will show that under any possible
history, it is an equilibrium for the ﬁrm and for each individual to play according to the
speciﬁed strategies. Every history can be categorized as either on-the-equilibrium-path or
oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path. On-the-equilibrium-path histories induce particular beliefs. Given
the strategies of the candidate equilibrium, individuals can have four terminal beliefs and
four interim beliefs over the ﬁrm’s discount factor: 1) δ<δ d,2 )δ ∈ [δd,δx),3 )δ ∈ [δx,δy),
4) δ ≥ δyand 5) δ ∈ (δd,δy],6 )δ ≥ δd,7 )δ<δ yand 8) δ ∈ (0,1].
We begin by showing that it is a best response for players to play according to equilibrium
in each of these states.
1)—2) If individuals believe that δ<δ x then it must be that the ﬁrm has cheated an x.
Since the ﬁrm is expected to cheat all subsequent individuals, no individual trusts the
ﬁrm. Since no individual trusts the ﬁrm, it is a best response for the ﬁrm to cheat at
every opportunity. The value of such histories to the ﬁrm is 0.
3) If individuals believe that δ ∈ [δx,δy) then it must be that a y has been cheated and
every x has been treated fairly, including at least one x subsequent to the cheated y.
The equilibrium value to the ﬁr mo fs u c hb e l i e f si sg i v e nb yV3 = γx(1 − α)+δV3 or
V3 = Vx.T h u sa sl o n ga tδ ≥ δx, it is a best response for the ﬁrm to treat x’s fairly
and to cheat every y.
4) If individuals believe that δ ≥ δy then in must be that every individual has been treated
fairly including at least one y. The equilibrium value to the ﬁrm of such beliefs is Vs
and as long as δ ≥ δy, it is a best response for the ﬁrm to treat all individuals fairly.
5) If individuals believe that δ ∈ [δd,δy) then it must be that x’s have been encountered
and never been cheated, a y has been cheated and no x’s have been encountered
subsequent to the y being cheated. Since y individuals anticipate being cheated, they
never trust again and since y individuals never trust the ﬁrm, it is a best response for
the ﬁrm to cheat every y.A nx individual will trust the ﬁrm if and only if she believes
that the expected gain from being treated fairly, [F(δy) − F(δx)](α − c), outweighs
the expected loss from being cheated, [F(δx) − F(δd)](c − β).I ft h eﬁrm encounters
an x and the x trusts the ﬁrm then the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from treating the x fairly is
(1 − α)+δVx and the payoﬀ from cheating the x is 1 − β.I fδ ≥ δx then the ﬁrm’s
28best response is to treat the x fairly and play proceeds to 3). If δ<δ x then the ﬁrm’s
best response is to cheat the x and play proceeds to 2).
6) If individuals believe that δ ≥ δd then it must be that x’s have been encountered and
treated fairly and no y’s have been encountered. There are three separate cases to be
analyzed:
1. δ ∈ [δd,δx): Suppose the ﬁrm encounters a y. According to equilibrium the ﬁrm
cheats the y and its payoﬀ is (1−β)+δVda where Vda is the continuation payoﬀ
from cheating the next x it encounters. Vda must satisfy Vda = γx(1−β)+γyδVda
or Vda = γx(1 − β)/(1 − γyδ).I fi n s t e a dt h eﬁrm treats the y fairly, individuals
believe δ ≥ δy so that the ﬁr mc a no n l yc o n t i n u et op l a ya si fi ti sf a i rt oa l lo ri t
can cheat the next individual and go oﬀ the equilibrium path (there’s no point
t ow a i t i n gt og oo ﬀ the equilibrium path). When δ ≥ δs it prefers the former and
gets payoﬀ (1−α)+δVs.W h e nδ<δ s it strictly prefers the latter and gets payoﬀ
(1−α)+δ(1−β). First note that for γx ≥ γy, Vda is minimized at γx = γy =1 /2
so that the equilibrium payoﬀ, (1 − β)+δV!da, is therefore bounded below by
2(1 − β)/(2 − δ).W h e nδ ≥ δs, some straightforward manipulation reveals that
2(1 − β)/(2 − δ) ≥ (1 − α)/(1 − δ).W h e nδ<δ s, it is similarly straightforward
to show that 2(1−β)/(2−δ) > (1−α)+δ(1−β). Therefore in either case, it is
ab e s tr e s p o n s ef o rt h eﬁrm to play according to the equilibrium and cheat the
y.
Now suppose that the ﬁrm encounters an x. According to equilibrium the ﬁrm
treats the x fairly in order to cheat the next y whereupon it then will cheat the
next x.T h e ﬁrm’s payoﬀ to being fair to the x is (1 − α)+δVdb where Vdb =
γx((1−α)+δVdb)+γy((1−β)+δVda) or Vdb =( 1−β)(1−δsγx+
δγxγy
1−δγy)/(1−δγx).
On the other hand, if the ﬁrm cheats the x,p l a ym o v e so ﬀ the equilibrium path
and the ﬁrm gets 1−β. Therefore the ﬁrm is fair whenever (1−α)+δVdb ≥ 1−β.








Since Vdb is increasing in δ, it follows that if δ ≥ δd then (1 −α)+δVdb ≥ 1−β.
2. δ ∈ [δx,δy): According to equilibrium the ﬁrm treats the x’s fairly and cheats
29the ﬁrst y it encounters. Its equilibrium payoﬀ is V 0 = γx[(1−α)+δV 0]+γy[(1−
β)+δVx] >V x.S i n c eδ ≥ δx the ﬁrm strictly prefers to treat x’s fairly.
3. δ ≥ δy: According to equilibrium the ﬁrm treats all individuals fairly and its
equilibrium payoﬀ is Vs =( 1− α)/(1 − δ). Suppose that the ﬁrm encounters an
x. If it cheats the x, it gets 1−β.S i n c eδ>δ s,t h eﬁrm strictly prefers to treat
the x fairly.
Suppose that the ﬁrm encounters a y. If it cheats the y, then individuals will
believe that δ ∈ [δd,δy) and provided that case 5)’s conditions on F are satisﬁed,
the ﬁrm’s best response is to treat future x’s fairly. Therefore the ﬁrm’s maximal
continuation payoﬀ from cheating the y is 1 − β + δVx.S i n c e δ>δ s, Vs >
1 − β + δVx and the ﬁrm strictly prefers to treat the y fairly.
7) If individuals believe that δ<δ y then it must be that no x’s have been encountered
and the ﬁrm cheated the ﬁrst y.T y p ey individuals never trust because they expect
to be cheated and since y individuals never trust, it is a best response for the ﬁrm to
cheat y’s.
For the x’s if the ﬁrm cheats the x,i tg e t s1 − β.I fi tt r e a t st h ex fairly, it gets Vx.
Thus when δ<δ x,t h eﬁrm strictly prefers to cheat the x and when δ ≥ δx,t h eﬁrm
prefers to treat the x fairly.
8) If δ ∈ [0,1) then the ﬁrm has not yet encountered any individuals. A y individual will
only trust the ﬁrm if the expected gain from being treated fairly, [1 − F(δy)](α − c),
outweighs the expected loss from being cheated, F(δy)(c − β).I f y’s trust the ﬁrm
then clearly x’s will also be willing to trust the ﬁrm.
Suppose that the ﬁrm encounters a y.I ft h eﬁrm treats the y fairly, the game proceeds
to case 4) with an equilibrium payoﬀ of Vs.I ft h eﬁrm cheats the y, the game proceeds
to case 7). If δ ≥ δx then Vx ≥ 1 − β and the ﬁrm treats x’s fairly. If δ<δ x then
Vx < 1−β and the ﬁrm cheats the x.T h u st h eﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ from cheating
the y is 1−β+δVda if δ<δ x and 1−β+δVx if δ ≥ δx. We know that 1−β+δVx >V s
for δ<δ y.M o r e o v e r ,w h e nδ<δ x, Vda >V x so that 1−β +δVda > 1−β +δVx >V s
and the ﬁrm strictly prefers to cheat the y. ¥
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